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71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 541 (2000)
KARL LLEWELLYN’S FADING IMPRINT
ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Gregory E. Maggs*
Introduction
The Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) at one time indisputably
owed more to Professor Karl N. Llewellyn than to anyone else. Although
Llewellyn did not initiate the plan to combine various uniform state laws
on business subjects into a coherent code,1 he played a pivotal role in
translating this objective into the U.C.C. Llewellyn led the U.C.C.’s
drafting as the “Chief Reporter” from 1942 until his death in 1962.2 He and
his wife, Professor Soia Mentschikoff, also served as reporters for three of
the nine “articles”--or principal parts--of the U.C.C. 3 Throughout this
process, Llewellyn consistently strived to make the U.C.C. distinct from
other statutes and laws by imbuing it with features that reflected his deeply
held juridical beliefs. 4 For these reasons, the U.C.C. has acquired *542
nicknames like “Karl’s Kode”5 and “Lex Llewellyn.”6

*

Associate Professor of Law, G eorge W ashington U niversity Law Sc hoo l. I
thank Professor Peter B. M aggs for his helpful suggestions and my many colleagues
at the George W ashington U niversity Law Sc hoo l who gave m e valuable co mments
when I prese nted this article as a work-in-progress. Dean Michael Young provided
generous assistance.
1
Mr. W illiam A. Schnader prop osed the idea in 1940 when serving as the
President of the N ational Conference of Comm issioners on Uniform States Laws
(“N.C.C.U.S.L.”). See W illiam Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement
300 (1973); 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code
§ 1, at 3 (3d prac. ed. 1988).
2
See T wining, supra note 1, at 284 .
3
See id.
4
See id . at 271 (concluding that “there is no d oub t that Llewellyn was easily the
most important single figure” involved in the U .C.C.’s creation); Soia M entschikoff,
High lights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 M od. L. Rev. 167, 168 n.3 (1964)
(noting that “[d]espite the numbers of persons involved in the drafting of the Code,
the extent to which it reflects Llewellyn’s philosophy of law and his sense of
com merc ial wisdo m and need is startling”).
5
See Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl’s New Kode: An
Essay on the Jurisprudence o f Our N ew Comm ercial Law, 11 Vill. L. Rev. 213
(1966).
6
See Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Probs. 330, 330-34 (1951); see also Twining, supra note
1, at 27 1 (ide ntifying similar appellations).
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Llewellyn was a leader of the Legal Realist movement that emerged in
this country during the 1920s and 1930s.7 Scholars associated with this
school of jurisprudence did not agree on everything, but they all held an
intense interest in understanding what actually influences judges when they
decide cases.8 As discussed more fully within, some of the Legal Realists,
including Llewellyn, shared a prescriptive vision for crafting legislation.
They believed that statutes should seek to improve judicial decisions by
recognizing that judges inevitably act with considerable discretion, and by
seeking to guide this discretion rather than futilely attempting to eliminate
it.9
When Llewellyn set to work on the U.C.C. project, he naturally wanted
to implement his jurisprudential ideas.10 As the following in-depth
discussion will show, Llewellyn succeeded in giving the U.C.C. at least
five important features inspired by *543 Legal Realism. In particular, as a
result of his influence, the U.C.C.:
• favored open-ended standards over firm rules;
• avoided formalities;
7

See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and
Practice (1962) (presenting a series of essays of the version of Realism Llewellyn
developed from the 192 0s until his death in 1962).
8
Pro fessor B rian Le iter concisely has summarized the typical contemporary
understanding of Legal Realism as follows: “Legal Realism is fundamentally: (1)
a descriptive theory about the nature of judicial decision, according to which, (2)
judges exercise unfettered discretion, in ord er (3) to reac h results based on their
personal tastes and values, which (4) they then rationalize after-the-fact with
app ropriate legal rules and reasons.” Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:
Towa rd a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 267, 268 (1997). See also
James J. White, The Influence of American Legal Realism on Article 2 of the
Uniform Commerc ial Code, in P rescrip tive Fo rmality and N ormative Rationality
in Modern Legal Systems 401, 401 (W erner Krawietz et al. eds., 1994) (arguing
that the Legal Realists believed that “judges’ decisions arise not merely from the
rules they state in their opinions, but at least as much from unstated reasons--from
the facts before them, from the expectation of the parties in the trade, and from the
judges’ own jud gment about fairness.”). As Leiter points out, ho wever, this
characterization lacks complete accuracy because numerous writers identified
themselves with Legal Realism, but had som ewhat different ideas. See Leiter, supra,
at 269.
9
See Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 189-90; Leiter, supra note 8, at 284.
10
See Twining, supra note 1, at 321-22 (desc ribing how and w hy Llewellyn
wanted to implement his jurisprudential views into the drafting of the U .C.C.): 1
W hite & Summers, supra note 1 , § 1, at 3 (desc ribing the history o f the pro ject).
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• required and facilitated the “purposive interpretation” of its provisions;
• did not attempt to provide an exclusive statement of the law, but
instead directed courts to supplement its rules with general legal and
equitable principles;11 and
• provided a range of remedies that principally served to make injured
parties whole.
In recent years, the U.C.C. has undergone considerable expansion and
revision. Article 2A on leases of goods and Article 4A on funds transfers
have been added.12 Articles 2A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 have been extensively
revised.13 Moreover, drafts of new versions of Articles 1, 2, and 2A are
currently in the works. 14
11

Arguably, Llewellyn also sought to make the U.C.C. nonexclusive by
incorporating rules established by prior dealings between the parties and by customs
and usages of trade. See U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (19 99) (“A course of dealing between
parties and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or
of which they are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or
qualify terms of an agreement.”); id. § 1-20 5(5) ( “An a pplicable usage o f trade in
the place where any part of performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the
agreement as to that part of the performance.”). I have not discussed this aspect of
the U.C .C.’s nonexclusivity in this article for two reason s. First, prior contract law
also incorporated this feature to a large extent. See U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. (citing the
Uniform Sales Act §§ 9(1), 15(5), 18(2), and 71 as relevant prior uniform statutory
codifications); Restatement of the Law of Contracts §§ 247, 248 (19 32) (making
operative both usages between the parties and usages of trade). Second, I found it
difficult to discern whether the recent revisions to the U.C.C. have retained or
rejected this principle separately from their more general abandonment of
non-exclusivity. For an excellent re cent review an d criticism of the U .C.C.’s
incorporation of customs and usages of trade, see Lisa Bernstein, T he Q uestionable
Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporatio n Strategy: a Preliminary Study, 66 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1999 ).
12
See U.C.C. art. 2A (1999), 1B U.L.A. 64 7 (1989 ); U.C .C . art. 4A (1999), 2B
U.L.A. 45 5 (1991 ).
13
See Kathleen Patchel, The Uniform Commercial Code Survey Part I:
Introduction, 53 Bus. Law. 1457 (19 98) (summarizing the various developments).
14
The American Law Institute (“A.L.I.”) and N.C.C.U .S.L. have been working
on these articles for several years, and had hoped to complete Articles 2 and 2A in
1999, and Article 1 in 2001. See id. In July 1999, however, the N.C.C.U.S.L.
decided that the draft of Article 2 would face too much industry o ppo sition to
perm it its widespread ado ption. Accordingly, it has de cided to redirect Article 2’s
drafting to make it less controversial. This development will delay promulgation of
revised versions of Articles 1, 2 , and 2 A for a n unknown perio d. See State Law
Commission A ppo ints New Group to Finish Drafting Work on Articles 2, 2A, 68

4
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*544 This article contends that these substantial additions and revisions
have done more than merely alter and augment the legal rules in the U.C.C.
They have had the additional effect of diminishing Llewellyn’s jurisprudential contributions. The modern drafters and revisers of the U.C.C. have not
strived to retain the five legislative features identified above. Indeed, in
some instances, they specifically have rejected them and the philosophy
behind them.
This thesis may strike those who have not been following U.C.C.
developments as rather extraordinary because the U.C.C. long has been
regarded as the apogee of the Legal Realists’ practical accomplishments.
Those who have practiced or taught in the area of commercial law,
however, will find the argument less surprising, for the jurisprudential
changes to the U.C.C. during the recent revisions would have been hard to
miss.15 Yet, no one has attempted to analyze the U.C.C.’s new jurisprudence in a systematic manner. As a result, even readers familiar with the
amendments to the U.C.C. may find the extent to which Llewellyn’s
influence has faded startling.
The remainder of this article contains four parts. Part I describes the
U.C.C. and its amendments over the past five decades.16 Part II then seeks
to document the U.C.C.’s jurisprudential shifting. 17 Considering each of the
five features listed above, it contrasts the early versions of the U.C.C. with
the present official text and the latest drafts of proposed revisions. It shows
in each instance that, while Llewellyn’s jural input has persisted to some
extent, it has diminished considerably.
Part III discusses the implications of this development.18 It infers from
Llewellyn’s fading imprint on the U.C.C. that his brand of Legal Realism
no longer holds its dominant position in American legal thought. It further
conjectures that our legal *545 culture may have become too pluralistic to
U.S.L.W . 2120 (Aug. 31, 1999); ALI and NCCUSL A nnounce New D rafting
Committee for UCC Articles 2 and 2A (Aug. 18, 1999) < http://www.nccusl.org/
pressrel/ucc2a2.htm> [hereinafter ALI/NCC USL P ress Release] (describing the
current status of these revisions).
15
Many com merc ial law textb ook s call attention to the change in jurisprudential
styles. See, e.g., Robert L. Jordan & W illiam D. W arren, Ne gotiable Instruments,
Payments and Credits 2 (4th ed. 1997) (noting that the “drafting style reflected in
revised Article 3,” for which the authors served as reporters, “is quite different from
that of the previous statute”).
16
See infra Pa rt I.
17
See infra Part II.
18
See infra Pa rt III.
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expect major codifications to reflect forever any one school of jurisprudence.
The last section states a brief conclusion.19 It urges judges and lawyers
at a minimum to recognize the new character of the U.C.C. It also calls for
modifying the draft of the proposed revision to Article 1 to make its
provisions consistent with the U.C.C.’s new character.
I. Creation And Revision Of The U.C.C.A. Origins of the Uniform
Commercial Code
In the late 1800s, various leaders of the bar urged the enactment of
uniform state laws on commercial subjects.20 Their call led to the
formation of a group called the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (“N.C.C.U.S.L.”) in 1892.21 From that time until the
present, the N.C.C.U.S.L. has sought to draft model laws and to persuade
legislatures to enact them.22
The N.C.C.U.S.L. achieved early success. In 1896, the N.C.C.U.S.L.
published the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (“N.I.L.”), a model law
governing checks, notes, and bills of exchange.23 Many states quickly
enacted the N.I.L. By 1940, the N.C.C.U.S.L. had convinced every state
and various other American jurisdictions to adopt it.24
Inspired by the favorable reception of the N.I.L., the N.C.C.U.S.L.
promulgated several additional model uniform laws.25 These laws included
the Uniform Sales Act26 and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,27 both
drafted by Professor Samuel Williston,28 and the Uniform Trust Receipts

19

See infra Conclusion.
See Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Service--A Centennial History of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 17-18 (1991)
(desc ribing the mo vement for uniform state laws).
21
See id. at 11.
22
See genera lly id.
23
See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, § 1, at 2-3.
24
See W illiam Schnader, A Sho rt History of the Preparation and Enactment of
the Uniform Commercial C ode , 22 U . Miami L. R ev. 1, 2 (1967).
25
See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, § 1, at 3.
26
See U nif. Sales A ct, 1 U .L.A. 1 (1950).
27
See Unif. Wareho use Receipts Act, 3 U.L.A. 1 (1959).
28
See S amuel W illiston, Life an d Law: An A utobiography 219 (194 0).
20
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Act,29 *546 drafted by Professor Karl Llewellyn.30 Many state legislatures
adopted these model laws.31
In 1940, William Schnader, who was then the President of the
N.C.C.U.S.L., proposed creating a complete commercial code that would
address and unify a variety of different business-related laws.32 In view of
the massive nature of this undertaking, the N.C.C.U.S.L. agreed to work on
the project with the American Law Institute (“A.L.I.”),33 which had
published the Restatements of the Law of Contracts, Torts, Property, and
other subjects.
The A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. decided that the U.C.C. should address
eight subjects: sales of goods, commercial paper (negotiable instruments),
bank deposits and collections, letters of credit, bulk sales, documents of
title, investment securities, and secured credit.34 The N.C.C.U.S.L.
appointed Llewellyn to serve as the “Chief Reporter.”35 Despite his
nontraditional legal views and spirited personality, the N.C.C.U.S.L.
evidently thought that his energy, enthusiasm, experience in commercial
law, and prior success with the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act, made him an
appealing candidate for the position.36 Llewellyn’s wife, Soia Mentschikoff, served as his principal assistant.37 Together, they worked with a
number of the most gifted academic and practicing attorneys in drafting the
U.C.C.38

29

See Unif. Trust Receipts Act, 9C U.L.A. 231 (195 7).
See id.; Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting 595-607 (1925)
(statement of K arl Llew ellyn as draftsman of the U niform Trust Receipts Act).
31
See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, § 1, at 3.
32
See id .
33
See id.
34
See 1 William T. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series 1-101 :1
(1998) (identifying the subjects and principal drafters of the U .C.C.).
35
See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, § 1, at 3.
36
See James J. Connolly et al., Alcoholism and Angst in the Life and Wo rk of
Karl Llewellyn, 24 Ohio N .U. L. Rev. 43, 97-98 (199 8); Fred H . Miller, Realism
Not Idealism in Uniform Laws--Observations from the Revision of the UCC, 39 S.
Tex. L. Re v. 707, 71 0 n.10 (1998 ).
37
See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, § 1, at 3.
38
The principal drafters of the other articles of the U.C .C. included William
Prosser, Fairfax Leary, Jr., Friedrich Kessler, Charles Bunn, Allison Dunham, and
Gra nt Gilm ore. S ee id. at 4.
30
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In drafting the U.C.C., Llewellyn wanted to improve upon various prior
uniform acts that the N.C.C.U.S.L. had promulgated*547 on commerical
subjects.39 He wanted to create a statute that would reduce conflicts among
jurisdictions, that would clarify the law, that would make the law more
accessible, and that would modernize legal rules to keep them in harmony
with commercial developments.40 Moreover, as Part III of this article will
show, the project gave Llewellyn a practical opportunity to implement
many of his jurisprudential ideas.
B. Promulgation and Enactment
The A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. promulgated the first version of the U.C.C.
in 1951, calling it the “1952 Official Text.”41 This initial version contained
nine substantive articles. Article 1 stated general principles and definitions
that applied throughout the Code.42 Article 2 covered sales of goods.43
Articles 3 and 4 dealt with commercial paper and bank deposits and
collections. Article 5 addressed letters of credit. 44 Articles 6, 7, and 8
governed bulk sales, documents of title, and investment securities.45
Finally, Article 9 covered security interests in personal property. 46
Pennsylvania enacted the 1952 Official Text in 1953.47 During the next
few years, a law reform commission in New York reviewed the model law
and identified numerous problems that needed to be corrected before New
York could adopt the Code.48 In 1957 and 1958, the A.L.I. and
N.C.C.U.S.L. modified the U.C.C. in response to these recommendations.49
Minor additional changes followed in 1962.50

39

See Karl Llewe llyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 779, 779
(1953).
40
See id . at 779 -82.
41
See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, §1, at 4.
42
See id . §1, at 2.
43
See id.
44
See id .
45
See id.
46
See id .
47
See id . §1, at 4.
48
See genera lly New Yo rk State Law Revision Commission, Report of the Law
Revision Commission for 1956 68 (1956) (concluding the “the Uniform Com mercial Code is not satisfactory in its present form and cannot be m ade satisfactory
without comprehensive re-examinatio n and revision ”).
49
See 1 W hite & Summers, supra note 1 , §1, at 4.
50
See id .
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*548 These early revisions corrected shortcomings in the U.C.C., and
made it acceptable to legislatures across the nation. By 1968, every state
except Louisiana had adopted every article of the U.C.C.51 Louisiana
initially had difficulty incorporating the U.C.C. into its civil law system,
but eventually enacted much of it or modified other state laws to make them
similar to the U.C.C.52 The District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin
Islands have enacted all of the U.C.C.,53 and Puerto Rico has enacted some
of it.54
A major revision of Article 9 occurred in 1972, but the changes did not
alter its theory, scope, or style. 55 Instead, the amendments mostly addressed
technical problems that had arisen with the original draft. 56 Eventually,
forty-nine states adopted the revised version of Article 9.57 The drafters
also revised Article 8 in 1977.58
C. Extensive Modern Revisions
Starting in the late 1980s, the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. began what has
become an extensive expansion and overhaul of the U.C.C. The process
generally has proceeded as follows. Upon hearing persuasive arguments
for adding or revising an article, the Executive Committee of the
N.C.C.U.S.L. and the Council of the A.L.I. have voted to begin new
drafting.59 The President of N.C.C.U.S.L. then has appointed a drafting
committee. 60 This committee typically has consisted of about a dozen
members, a few from the A.L.I. and the rest from the *549 N.C.C.U.S.L.61
Usually one or two law professors, who are also members of the A.L.I.,

51

See id . §1, at 5.
See Christian Callens, Comment, Louisiana Civil Law and T he Uniform
Commercial Code: Interpreting the New Louisiana U.C.C.-Inspired Sales Articles
on P rice, 69 Tul. L. Rev . 164 9, 16 50-5 1 (1995 ).
53
See 1 W hite & Summers, supra note 1 , §2, at 5.
54
See Nego tiable Instruments and Banking Transactions Act, Law No. 176 of
Aug. 31, 1996 , P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 19, § 401 (Supp. 1997) (adopting articles 3, 4,
and 4A).
55
See 2 W hite & Summers, supra note 1 , §2, at 5.
56
See id . § 23 -1, at 24 0 & n.1.
57
See William M. Burke et al., Interim Rep ort on the Activities of the A rticle
9 Study Committee, 46 Bus. Law. 1883, 188 4 (1991 ) (indicating that o nly Vermont
did not adopt the revised version of Article 9).
58
Compare U.C.C. art. 8 (1977 ), with U.C.C. art. 8, 2C U.L.A. 267, 267 (1991).
59
See M iller, supra note 3 6, at 71 4.
60
See id .
61
See id .
52
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have served as the reporter(s) of the articles. In addition, the drafting
committee has had the input of an appointed review committee and various
advisors and consultants.62 After completing the drafting, the A.L.I. and
N.C.C.U.S.L. then have voted on whether to approve the revised articles.
Upon approval by both organizations, and endorsement by the American
Bar Association, the N.C.C.U.S.L. has presented the revisions to the state
legislatures for enactment into law.63
Through this process, the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. promulgated the
original version of Article 2A on leases of goods in 1987,64 and a revised
version of Article 2A in 1990.65 In 1989, they created Article 4A on funds
transfers.66 They subsequently revised Articles 3,67 5,68 8,69 and 9,70 and
substantially amended Article 4.71 In addition, the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L.
have recommended that states either adopt a revised version of Article 6 or
repeal the original version.72
For the past several years, the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. also have been
working on complete revisions of Articles 1, 2, and 2A.73 At one point,
they expected to promulgate the final official texts of these articles in 1999
or 2000,74 but disagreement has delayed the project.75 Of the entire code,
only Article 7 remains unchanged and not under revision. The following

62

Prefatory notes to each of the revised articles identify the various persons who
have worked on them. See, e.g., U.C .C. art. 3 pref. no te (19 90).
63
The N.C.C.U.S.L. maintains a website presenting facts about the revised
U.C.C. articles. This site lists the persons who worked on the drafts and the
endorsements by the American Bar Association. See The National Conference of
Comm issioners on Uniform State Laws (last modified Aug. 24, 1999) <http://www.
nccusl.org> .
64
See U .C.C. art. 2A (1987); Unif. Commercial Code art. 2A, 1B U.L.A. 647,
649 (1989).
65
See id . (199 0); 1B U.L.A. supp. 18 2, 18 4 (1990 ).
66
See id . (198 9); 2B U.L.A. 45 5, 45 5 (1991 ).
67
See U .C.C. art. 3 (1990 ); 2 U .L.A. 5 , 5 (19 91).
68
See U .C.C. art. 5 (1995 ); 2B U.L.A. 13 3, 13 3 (Su pp. 1 999 ).
69
See U.C.C. art. 8 (1994); 2C U .L.A. 47, 47 (Supp. 1999 ).
70
See U .C.C. art. 9 (1999); 3 U.L.A. 9, 9 (Supp. 199 9) (effective July 1, 2001).
71
See U .C.C. art. 4 (1990 ); 2B U.L.A. 5, 5 (1991).
72
See U .C.C. art. 6 (1987 ); 2C U.L.A. 5, 5 , 7 (19 91).
73
See supra note 14.
74
See su pra note 14.
75
See su pra note 14.
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table *550 summarizes the status of each of the articles of the U.C.C. since
the late 1980s:
Art.

Title

Status of
Rev isions

Status of
Rev isions

Rep orter(s)

1

Gene ral Provisions

In progre ss

n/a

Neil Cohen

2

Sales

In progre ss 76

n/a

2A

Leases

48 / 4778

3

Negotiab le
Instruments

Added 1987,
Amended
1990, & In
Progress
Revised 1990

Henry Gabriel77
Henry
Gabriel79

4

Bank Dep osits &
Collections

Amended
1990

49

4A

Funds T ransfers

Added 1989

52

5

Letters of Credit 5

Revised 1995

38

6

Bulk Sales

Revised 1987
& 1989 80

5 / 3881

7
8

Documents of Title
Investment Securities

No revision
Revised 1994

n/a
48

76

49

W illiam W arren & Rob ert
Jordan
W illiam W arren & Rob ert
Jordan
W illiam W arren & Rob ert
Jordan
James J.
W hite
Steven Ha rris
& W illiam
Hawkland
n/a
James R ogers

See supra note 14.
See ALI/NCCUSL Press Release, supra note 14.
78
See S.D. Codified Laws § 57A -2A-101 (199 9) (pre-revision version of of
article 2A).
79
Ronald DeKoven served as reporter for the original version of Article 2A. See
1B U.L.A. 64 8 (1999 ).
80
The 1987 revision substantially changed Article 6. The 1989 revision
suggested as alternatives either repealing Article 6 or adopting the 1987 Official
Text. See 6C Hawkland, supra note 34, §§ 6-101 to 6-102.
81
Five states have adopted and retained the 1987 revision. Thirty-eight states
have repealed Article 6. See A Few Facts About Revised Article 6 of the U CC (last
modified Jan. 11, 2000) <http:// www.nccusl.org/factsheet/ucc6-fs.html> (listing
states that have adopted the revision or repealed the original).
77
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Secured Transa ctions

Revised
1999, (effective July 1,
2001)

5

11
Charles Mooney & Steven
Harris

*551 The drafting process has not been confidential. On the contrary,
numerous outsiders have had access to the proposed revisions, and have
had the opportunity to influence their substance. For example, the prefatory
note to the revised version of Article 5 on letters of credit explains:
Hundreds of groups were invited to participate in the drafting process.
Twenty Advisors were appointed, representing a cross-section of interested
parties. In addition 20 Observers regularly attended drafting meetings and
over 100 were on the mailing list to receive all drafts of the revision. The
Drafting Committee meetings were open and all those who attended were
afforded full opportunity to express their views and participate in the
dialogue. The Advisors and Observers were a balanced group with ten
representatives of users (Beneficiaries and Applicants); five representatives
of governmental agencies; five representatives of the U.S. Council on
International Banking (USCIB); seven from major banks in letter of credit
transactions; eight from regional banks; and seven law professors who
teach and write on Letters of Credit. . . . . The drafts were regularly
reviewed and discussed in The Business Lawyer, Letter of Credit Update,
and in other publications.82 *552 The influence from consumer and industry
groups, according to some observers, has increased greatly in the past
decade.83 Some evidence of the power of outsiders comes from recent
failures of three proposed articles. First, in the early 1980s, the A.L.I. and
N.C.C.U.S.L. worked on an article that would have covered all payment
transactions. This project engendered controversy among banks and
consumer groups and ultimately had to be abandoned.84 Second, the A.L.I.
and N.C.C.U.S.L. worked for several years on a new proposed Article 2B,
which would have governed computer information transactions. In 1999,
however, the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. decided that Article 2B would not
become part of the UCC; instead, the N.C.C.U.S.L. would promulgate the
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U.C .C. art. 5 pref. no te (19 99).
My colleague, Professor Andy Spanogle, who has served as a member of the
A.L.I. for many years, informs me that he has observed a great increase in the
number of lobbyists attending U.C.C. drafting meetings. See also M iller, supra note
36, at 719 -20 (d escribing indu stry input into the dra fting).
84
See Gregory E. Maggs, New Payment Devices and General Principles of
Payment Law, 72 No tre Dame L. Rev. 753, 77 3-75 (1997 ) (discussing the history
of the U niform New Pa yments Code).
83
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law as the “Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act.”85 Finally,
as noted above, the proposed revised Article 2 recently failed to gain the
approval of the N.C.C.U.S.L.86 Objections by industry groups suggested
to the N.C.C.U.S.L. that state legislatures would not support the revision.87
II. The U.C.C.’s Distinctive Jurisprudential Features
The revisions to the U.C.C. have added many new legal rules, and have
altered the substance of numerous existing rules. Lawyers familiar with
pre-revision versions of the U.C.C. have had to relearn much of what they
previously studied. One writer has lamented that the “Uniform Commercial
Code of today is not the Uniform Commercial Code of our youth.”88
The changes to the U.C.C., however, have done more than alter the
substance of the law. They also have eroded the most *553 important
jurisprudential characteristics that Llewellyn gave the U.C.C. The
following discussion shows how the additions and revisions have not
preferred standards over rules, have not avoided formalities, have not
sought to foster purposive interpretation, have tried to make the U.C.C. a
more exclusive statement of the law, and have fashioned remedies based on
considerations other than fully compensating aggrieved parties.
A. Using Standards Instead of Rules
Llewellyn and his collaborators made the U.C.C. distinct from other
statutes by striving to employ open-ended “standards” instead of bright-line
“rules.” Although disagreement exists over the difference between rules
and standards,89 commentators typically distinguish them in the following
manner. Rules generally define the permitted or prohibited conduct with
precision, leaving the courts to determine only what happened. Standards,

85

See N.C.C.U.S.L. to Promulgate Freestanding Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (Ap r. 7, 19 99) <http:// www.nccusl.org/pressrel/2b rel.html> .
86
See A LI/N CCUS L Press Release, supra note 1 4.
87
See id .
88
Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code,
26 F la. St. U. L. Rev. 285, 28 6 (1999 ).
89
S ee Mark P. Gergan, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the
American Common Law, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 407, 409 n.3. (1999) (citing and
discussing numerous sources addressing the distinction between rules and
standards).
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by contrast, usually require courts to decide not only what happened, but
also to some extent what the law should permit and what it should not.90
Consider, for example, section 2-205 on firm offers.91 In this section,
the drafters made offers by merchants temporarily irrevocable if the
merchants had promised to keep them open, even if the merchants received
no consideration for their promises. In writing section 2-205, the drafters
needed to specify a period of irrevocability. They could have used a rule,
saying, for example, that firm offers cannot be revoked for ninety days.
Instead, they chose to employ a standard. Section 2-205 says that, unless
otherwise indicated, a firm offer will remain irrevocable for “a reasonable
time” up to three months even without consideration.92 In applying this
standard, a court must determine both how long an offer has remained *554
open and the reasonableness of the period under the particular facts.
Llewellyn did not invent standards. They have been used for centuries
in legislative documents. The Constitution, for example, prohibits “cruel
and unusual” punishments93 and “unreasonable” searches and seizures.94
Even prior to the U.C.C., commercial laws relied on standards. For
example, the Uniform Sales Act--drafted by Samuel Williston, a strong
opponent of Legal Realism--had open-ended standards.95
The U.C.C., however, differed from other laws because of the extent
and frequency of its reliance on standards instead of rules.96 Article 2 alone
uses the term “reasonable” in numerous contexts, such as good faith,97 the

90

See Lo uis Kaplow, Rules V ersus Standards: An E conomic Analysis, 42 Duke
L.J. 557, 5 59-6 0 (1992 ).
91
See U .C.C. §2-2 05 (199 9).
92
See id .
93
See U .S. Co nst. ame nd. V III.
94
See id . amen d. IV .
95
See Unif. Sales Act §45(2), 2 U.L.A. 52 (195 0) (“[I]t depends in each case
on the terms of the contract, and the circumstances of the case, whether the breach
of contract is so material as to justify the injured party in refusing to proceed
further....”).
96
See Twining, supra note 1, at 335 (“The Code differs from prior legislation
more in the extent than in the manner of use of [standards].”); Richard E. Sp eidel,
Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 254, 260 (1995)
(describing the “shift from rules to standards” as one of the “main characteristics”
of the U .C.C.).
97
See U .C.C. §2-1 03(1)(b ) (1999).
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statute of frauds,98 firm offers,99 contract formation,100 battle of the forms,
101
construction of terms,102 modifications,103 and dozens of additional
provisions.104 The other articles of the U.C.C. all contain similar examples.
The original Article 5, for example, employed the term “reasonable” to
specify the duration of notations of credit.105 Similarly, Article 9 says that
secured parties may dispose of collateral after taking “commercially
reasonable” steps.106
Indeed, so successful were the drafters in implementing open-ended
standards that many observers thought they went too far. Professor David
Mellinkoff, for example, complained: *555 “The word reasonable, effective
in small doses, has been administered by the bucket, leaving the corpus of
the Code reeling in dizzy confusion.” 107 Professor Richard Danzig
described the drafters’ overuse of standards as a “renunciation of legislative
responsibility and power.”108
The early versions of the U.C.C., to be sure, also employed a number of
bright-line rules. Most notably, the pre-revision versions of Articles 3 and
4, which dealt with negotiable instruments, contained very definite
provisions on liability. 109 The same held true for the pre-revision version

98

See id . §2-2 01(2).
See id . §2-2 05.
100
See id . §2-2 06(1)(a), (2).
101
See id . §2-2 07(1), (2)(c).
102
See id . §2-2 08(2).
103
See id . §2-2 09(5).
104
The following search in WESTLAW ’s ULA database identified 54 sections
in article 2 that use some variant of the term reasonable: “PR (“UNIFORM
COM ME RCIAL CO DE” AN D “ART ICLE 2”) & TE XT(RE ASON ABL!).”
105
See id . §5-1 08(2)(b ); 2B U.L.A. 58 8 (1991 ).
106
See U .C.C. §9-5 04(1) (1999 ).
107
David M ellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Y ale
L.J. 185, 1 85-8 6 (1967 ).
108
Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Comm ercial Co de, 27 Stan. L. Re v. 621, 62 2 (1975 ).
109
See Peter A. Alces, Toward a Jurisprudence of Bank-Customer Relations, 32
W ayne L. Rev. 1279, 1320 (1986) (“Llewellyn’s Sales Article proceeds from a
different jurisprudential perspective than that which guided the drafting of Article
4. The reasonableness of the transactors’ conduct... is inapposite in the law of
com merc ial pap er....”).
99
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of Article 5 on letters of credit. 110 Even in Article 2, Llewellyn declined to
use standards instead of rules in some instances. For example, the statute
of frauds requires a “writing” as opposed to some “reasonable evidence”
of the making of a contract. 111 Likewise, Article 2 generally sets forth
specific damage measurements,112 rather than merely telling judges to use
any reasonable means of compensating the plaintiff for losses.113
Llewellyn, however, usually favored standards, and had several
jurisprudential reasons for this preference. First, Llewellyn generally
trusted judges and business persons to develop, recognize, and follow
commercial norms.114 As one commentator explained:
The Code is founded not only on faith in the capacity of the business
community for satisfactory self-regulation within a framework of very
broadly drafted rules, but also on a faith *556 in judges to make honest,
sensible, commercially well-informed decisions once they have been given
some base-lines for judgment.115
Second, Llewellyn wanted to make the Code a durable, “semi-permanent” body of legislation.116 He believed that using open-ended standards
would allow courts to adjust the law as commercial practices change,
without having to wait for statutory amendments.117 Grant Gilmore has
explained in this regard that the U.C.C. sought to “[abolish] the past
without attempting to control the future.”118
Third, Llewellyn did not see much advantage to rules. He doubted that
they actually created more certainty than standards. On the contrary,
110

See, e.g., U.C.C. §5-114(1) (1994) (revised 1995), 2B U.L.A. 614 (1991)
(stating the issuer’s duty to honor d rafts in unequivo cal term s).
111
See U.C.C. §2-20 1(1) (1999 ).
112
See, e.g., id. §§ 2-70 6, 2-7 08, 2 -709 (measures o f seller’s damages); id.
§§2 -712 , 2-71 4 (measures of buyer’s damages).
113
For a coun terexample in which the drafters did u se a standard of reasonableness, see, for example, id. §2-714(1) (stating that when a buyer has accepted
nonconfo rming goods, he may receive compensation for the nonconformity “as
determined in any manner which is reasonable”).
114
See Llewellyn, supra note 39, at 782 (arguing against legislative drafting
efforts that seek to “corral” rather than guide judges).
115
Twining, sup ra note 1, at 336.
116
See U .C.C. §1-1 02 cmt. 1 (1 999 ).
117
See Jean Braucher, T he Repo C ode: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty
in Commercial Law, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 549, 555-56 (1997); Leiter, supra note 8, at
284 -85.
118
Grant Gilm ore, T he Ages of American L aw 85 (1977 ).
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Llewellyn thought that “legal rules have a . . . marginal role to play in
generating business expectations.”119 Llewellyn believed that certainty
exists because the market creates uniform practices.120
The recent changes to the U.C.C. have not eliminated all of its
standards. Every article, for example, continues to use the term “reasonable.”121 At the same time, however, the drafters of the new and revised
articles of the U.C.C. often have curtailed the use of standards, and have
resorted instead to rules. For instance, in revising Articles 3 and 4, the
drafters announced that they were seeking to improve the certainty of the
law and reduce litigation.122 They did this in part by tightening open-ended
standards. The new version of Article 3 now defines more specifically what
constitutes “ordinary care” for a bank.123 It further creates some per se
categories of failure to exercise ordinary care.124
*557 The drafters of the new Article 4A similarly eschewed open-ended
standards. Although they employed tests of “reasonableness” in a few
instances,125 they generally tried to establish firm rules. An official
comment to Article 4A says: “A deliberate decision was . . . made to use
precise and detailed rules to assign responsibility, define behavioral norms,
allocate risks and establish limits on liability, rather than to rely on broadly
stated, flexible principles.”126 For example, the drafters specified a certain
date upon which unaccepted payment orders become canceled by operation
of law.127 They also used specific rules to determine who bears liability for
unsuccessful funds transfers.128
The drafters of the revised version of Article 5 similarly recognized that
“[c]ertainty of payment . . . is a core element of the commercial utility of

119

Twining, sup ra note 1, at 336.
See id .
121
See, e.g., U.C.C §§ 1-102(3), 2-103(1)(b), 2A -103(1)(u), 3-103(a)(4),
4-103(d), 4A-105(a)(6), 5-108(b), 6-103(3)(i), 7-204(1), 8-102(a)(10),
9-10 4(a)(4)(C ).
122
See U .C.C. art. 3 pref. note (199 9) (B enefits in the Pub lic Interest).
123
See id . §§ 3 -103 (a)(7), 4-10 4(c).
124
See id. §3-405 (addressing forgery of indorsements by certain employees).
125
See, e.g., id. §4 A-20 2(b)-(c) (allo wing banks to adopt reaso nable security
measures); § 4A-204(a) (requiring customers to report an unauthorized payment
order within a reasonable time not to exceed 90 days).
126
Id. §4 A-10 2 cm t. (emp hasis ad ded ).
127
See id . §4A -211 (d).
128
Id. §4A-402(b ), (d) (stating liability for completed and unco mpleted payment
orders).
120
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letters of credit.”129 They thus tightened the law considerably. For example,
the revised Article 5 now “clearly and forcefully states the independence
of letter of credit obligations.”130 It also institutes a rule of “strict compliance” to specify when the issuer of a letter of credit may dishonor a
presentation,131 and defines specifically what constitutes strict compliance.
132
The article further narrows the definition of good faith because “greater
certainty of obligations is necessary and is consistent with the goals of
speed and low cost.”133
The drafters of the revised version of Article 8 also attempted to avoid
standards like “reasonableness.” For example, section 8-110 sets forth
definite choice-of-law rules, rejecting more open-ended principles.134 The
official comment explains:
*558 Because the policy of this section is to enable parties to determine,
in advance and with certainty, what law will apply to transactions governed
by this Article, the validation of selection of governing law by agreement
is not conditioned upon a determination that the jurisdiction whose law is
chosen bear a “reasonable relation” to the transaction.135
The drafters of the new version of Article 9 also stressed certainty over
flexibility. For example, they made the priority rules in connection with
securities more rigid. The official comment justifies the move toward firm
rules as follows:
One of the circumstances that led to the revision was the concern that
uncertainty in the application of the rules on secured transactions involving
securities and other financial assets could contribute to systemic risk by
impairing the ability of financial institutions to provide liquidity to the
markets in times of stress.136
As these changes indicate, the drafters of the new and revised articles
often have moved away from open-ended standards. They have worried
that standards produce litigation. They also have doubted that the benefits
of flexibility justify the costs of the uncertainty that it produces. While
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Id. art. 5 pref. no te (Benefits of Revise d Article 5 in G enera l).
Id.
131
See id . §5-1 08(a).
132
See id . §5-1 08(e).
133
Id. §5 -102 cmt. 3.
134
See id . §8-1 10.
135
Id. cm t. 3.
136
Id. §9 -328 app. XV I cmt. 8 (1999, effective Ju ly 1, 2000).
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standards may have benefits in some contexts, such as those addressed in
the Bill of Rights, the drafters appear to have doubted Llewellyn’s belief
that they are preferable to rules in commercial law. Professor James J.
White, the reporter for the revised Article 5, has taken this position
explicitly. He has expressed that it is “[b]etter to leave an occasional
widow penniless by the harsh application of the law than to disrupt
thousands of other transactions by injecting uncertainty and by encouraging
swarms of potential litigants and their lawyers to challenge what would
otherwise be clear and fair rules.”137
*559 B. Avoiding Formalities
Llewellyn also wanted to make the U.C.C. distinct from prior commercial acts by avoiding “formalities.” 138 In other words, he did not think the
U.C.C. should treat commercial transactions differently depending on
whether the parties used technical words, or structured their transaction in
particular ways, or created special kinds of records. He considered the
actual facts and circumstances of commercial transactions much more
important than the forms that they might take.139 Where formalities
formerly existed in the law, Llewellyn sought to eliminate them.
For example, contract law traditionally required the formality of a
distinct offer and acceptance before formation of a contract could occur.140
In section 2-204, however, the U.C.C. eliminated the requirements of an
offer and acceptance for the formation of contract by saying: “A contract
for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such
a contract.”141

137

2 W hite & Summers, supra note 1 , §26 -20, at 554 -55.
See B lack’s Law D ictionary 652 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “formality” as the
“conditions, in regard to method , order, arrangement, use of technical expressions,
performance of specific acts, etc., which are required by the law in the making of
contracts or conveyances, or in the taking of legal proceedings, to insure their
validity and regularity”).
139
See Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under Revised
Article 2, 35 W m. & M ary L. Rev. 1305, 1311 (1994) (discussing Llewellyn’s focus
on the intention of the parties).
140
See Duncan K ennedy, Form and Substance in Priva te Law Adjudication, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1691-92 (1976) (discussing how the traditional requirement of
an offer and acceptanc e is a form ality).
141
U.C .C. §2 -204 (1) (1 999 ).
138
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Llewellyn was not a fanatic opponent of formalities. In his view,
formalities did not necessarily cause problems in commercial transactions.
142
Indeed, at one time, he specifically questioned whether the law needed
to enforce commercial promises not under seal.143 He also described the
statute of frauds as “an amazing product . . . . [a]fter two centuries and a
half . . . better adapted to our needs than when it was first *560 passed.”144
His view was that “a business economy demands a means of quick, not one
of ‘informal’ contracting.”145
Usually, however, Llewellyn still wanted to avoid formalities in
commercial transactions for three reasons. First, formalities can often
create injustices.146 For example, the statute of frauds may prevent
recognition of a contract, even though the parties in fact had formed an
agreement that they wanted the courts to enforce. Eliminating formalities,
Llewellyn believed, may permit a fairer treatment of individual cases.147
Second, Llewellyn generally wanted the U.C.C. to reflect business
practices,148 and worried that imposing formalities would stand at odds
with this goal. After all, some business persons would not know the
required forms or technical rules.149 Others who did know the law would
have to take cumbersome steps to rearrange their conduct in order to
conform to the rules.150

142

SeeIngrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl
Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial
Law, 73 Geo. L.J. 1141, 1156 (1985) (discussing how Llewellyn saw some ben efits
in formal rules like the statute o f frauds).
143
See Karl N. Llewellyn, W hat Price Contract?--An Essa y in Perspective, 40
Yale L.J. 704, 7 40 (193 1).
144
Id. at 747; see also Charles L. Knapp & Nathan M. Crystal, Pro blem s in
Contract Law: Cases and M aterials 384 (3d ed . 1993) (quoting this passage and
suggesting that Llewellyn’s beliefs contributed to the decisio n to include the statute
of fraud s in Article 2).
145
Llewellyn, supra note 1 38, at 741 .
146
See G. Richa rd Sh ell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules
in Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw . U. L. Rev. 1198, 1203
n.23 (1988) (arguing that legal realism reflects a “desire to break through the
formality of legal classifications to the actual cond uct of co mmercial p arties”).
147
See L lewellyn, supra note 143, at 748 -50.
148
See genera lly Twining, supra note 1, at 313-2 1.
149
See M ooney, supra note 5, at 218 (noting that Llewellyn rebelled against
traditional formal contract doctrines that amo unted to “me aningless technicalities”).
150
See id . at 219 .
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Third, Llewellyn thought that many judges would seek to resolve cases
in a just manner regardless of whether the parties satisfied required
formalities. 151 In the extreme, they would decide on an outcome, then
mischaracterize the facts or legal authorities to support their decision, and
thereby distort the law with their lack of candor.152 Eliminating formalities
would aid judges and the justice system by allowing them to explain their
reasoning truthfully.153
*561 Llewellyn had considerable success in eliminating formalities
from the U.C.C.154 For example, as noted above, the original Article 2
greatly simplified the process of offer and acceptance in the law of sales.
155
In addition, the U.C.C. created large exceptions to the traditional

151

See W hite, supra note 8, at 401.
SeeKarl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 56
(1960).
153
See L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 429, 435 (1934)
(“The intellectual torture which our courts inflict on legal doctrine will be obviated
when we have brought ourselves to the point where we are willing to accept as
sufficient justification for a decision the ‘non-technical’ considerations which really
motivated it.”).
154
The drafters of the original U.C.C. generally sought to avoid formalities, yet
decided to include a number of them. For instance, the original Article 2 retained
a statute of frauds for contracts for the sale of goods. See U.C.C. §2-201(1) (1999).
The original Article 3 similarly contained various formalities. See Grant Gilmore,
Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 Creighton L. Rev. 441, 458
(1979). For example, it said that a note or check must be in writing, must be signed,
and must contain specific words. See U.C.C. § 3-104, 2 U.L.A. 224 (199 1). It also
gave great significance to the use of signatures and the words accompanying them.
See id. §§3-413 to 3-416, 2A U.L.A. 208-295 (1991) (stating the effect of various
kinds of signatures). The original Article 5 required letters of credit to be in writing.
See id. §5-104 , 2B U.L.A. 57 5-76 (1991). Article 7 similarly req uires written bills
of lading and warehouse receipts. See id. §7-202(2) (1999). Article 8 created a
statute of frauds for investment securities. See id. §8-319, 2C U .L.A. 563 (1991 ).
Article 9 stated formal requirements for financing statements. See id. §9-402
(1999).
155
See U.C.C. §2-20 4(1) (1999 ) (allowing a “con tract for sa le of goods... [to]
be m ade in any manner sufficient to show agreement”).
152
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formalities imposed by the statute of frauds156 and the parol evidence
rule.157 It also made seals completely inoperative.158
Perhaps most significantly, Articles 1 and 9 made the characterization
of different types of secured financing largely irrelevant.159 They treat all
forms of liens, collateral, and pledges as creating a “security interest,”
regardless of the names or forms used.160 For instance, they require courts
to treat a purported lease as a secured sale if the transaction has the
characteristics of a secured sale,161 saying that “[w]hether a transaction
creates a lease or security interest is determined by the facts of each case”
and listing various factors for the courts to consider.162
*562 Some opposition to formalities has persisted throughout the many
recent changes to the U.C.C. 163 The June 1999 draft of the proposed
revision of Article 2 would lessen the impact of the statute of frauds in the
context of sales of goods.164 The revised version of Article 3 now permits
presentment of negotiable instruments to take place electronically instead

156

See id.§2-201(2)-(3) (creating exceptions for confirmatory memoranda
between merchan ts, specially manufactured go ods, admissions, and part performance).
157
See id. §2-202(a)-(b) (creating exceptions based on course of dealing, usage
of trade, course of p erform ance, and consisten t additional term s).
158
See id . §2-2 03 (making seals inope rative in sales of go ods).
159
See id . §9-1 02(1)(a) (mak ing Article 9 ap plicab le to “any transaction
(regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal
property or fixtures”). See generally Grant Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism and
Article 9, 47 Neb. L. R ev. 65 9 (1968 ).
160
See U .C.C. §9-1 02(1)(a).
161
See id . §1-2 01(37) (defining security interest).
162
Id.
163
See Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification under Revised
Article 2, 35 W m. & M ary L. Rev. 1305, 1311 (1994) (noting the drafters of the
revised version of Article 2 so ught to m inimize forma lity).
164
See U .C.C. §2-2 01(1) (A nnual Meeting D raft 1999), availab le at National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (last modified June 28, 1999)
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ucc299am.htm> (raising the dollar
threshold, eliminating the quantity requirement, and expanding the exceptions). The
N.C .C.U .S.L., as noted above, voted not to approve this draft. See ALI/NCCUSL
Press Release, supra note 14. Consequently, only time will tell what changes to
Article 2 actually will occur.
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of only physically. 165 Similarly, letters of credit no longer have to be
written on paper.166 The statute of frauds in Article 8 has been removed.167
Much more commonly, however, the drafters of the new and the revised
articles have added formalities to the U.C.C. In the June 1999 draft of the
proposed revision of Article 2, for example, the drafters have taken a more
formal approach to the “battle of the forms” problem. A battle of the forms
problem arises when the offeree attempts to accept an offer, but states in
the acceptance terms that are different from, or additional to, the ones in the
offer. The current version of section 2-207 says that the terms of a contract
made by battling forms depend on what the parties would have considered
material.168 The revised version of the section, by contrast, would state a
fixed rule that the contract simply includes whatever terms are common to
both the offer and acceptance.169
Article 2A created a statute of frauds for leases of goods,170 even
though in most jurisdictions no writing previously had *563 been required
for enforcement of leases of personal property.171 The revised version of
Article 3 specifies that any instrument having the form of a check must be
negotiable.172 Unlike the issuer of a note, the drawer of a check may not
prevent application of the holder in due course doctrine by writing
something like “Not Negotiable” on the instrument.173
Although the new Article 4A does not require payment orders to take
any special form, it established numerous new formal requirements. The
drafters required over half a dozen different kinds of agreements or notices
to be in writing. For example, an unauthorized payment order will not be
effective, even if it passes a security procedure, unless the customer
“expressly agreed in writing” to be bound by any payment order that passed
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See U .C.C. §3-5 02.
See id . §§5 -102 (a)(14), 5-1 04.
167
See id . art. 8 pref. note.
168
See id . §2-2 07(2)(b ).
169
See id. §2-207(c)(1) (Annual Meeting Draft 1999), available at (last modified
June 28, 199 9) <http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ucc299am.htm> (stating
terms in the offer and acceptance becom e part of the contract “to the extent that they
agree ”).
170
See U .C.C. §2A -201 (1) (statute of frauds of sales of go ods).
171
SeeWilliam D. Hawkland & Frederick H. Miller, Hawkland & Miller U.C.C.
Series §2a-201:01 (1 997) (noting that some courts had applied section 2-2 01 to
lease cases by analogy).
172
See U .C.C. §3-1 04(c), (d).
173
See id .
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the security procedure.174 Similarly, a bank can limit its right to enforce
verified payment orders only by “express written agreement.”175 A bank,
moreover, can avoid responsibility for certain payment orders that
misdescribe the beneficiary if the bank delivered to the customer a “signed
. . . writing” stating information about the processing of payment orders.176
In addition, a bank that delays or improperly executes a payment order
bears liability for consequential damages only “to the extent provided in an
express written agreement.”177
The recently revised version of Article 9 also imposes new formalities.
For example, a new provision recognizes and gives effect to a federal
regulatory requirement that consumers receive written notices regarding
waiver of defense clauses.178 Another new section requires a written record
indicating that a creditor has decided to retain collateral in satisfaction of
the debt.179
These examples of new and continuing formalities reveal that the
drafters of the various revisions did not oppose for *564 malities as
strongly as Llewellyn and his collaborators. On the contrary, they appear
to have recognized that formalities may have some value. For example, they
can promote clarity in the law. One observer has commented that Articles
4A, 5, and 8 now tend to operate almost exclusively on symbols.180 Banks
and businesses favor this development because “[i]f these symbols are
appropriately communicated, authenticated, and preserved, then there is
absolutely no room for ordinary factual disputes.”181 Even consumers may
favor formalities because formalities allow them to distinguish between
acts that have legal consequences and those that do not. Several commentators--including the reporters of the revised Article 5 and the June 1999 draft
of the proposed revision of Article 2--have remarked:
Rules specifying how to “make it legal” are fundamental. Without them,
private ordering under law could not exist. One of the primary functions of
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See id .§4A -202 (c).
See id. §4A-203(a)(1).
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See id . §§4 A-20 7(c)(2), 4A-20 8(b)(2).
177
Id. §4A-305(c).
178
See id . §9-4 03(d) (revised 199 9) .
179
See id . §9-6 10(b) (revised 199 9).
180
See Joseph H. Sommer, A Law of Financial Accounts: Mo dern Payment and
Securities T ransfer Law, 5 3 B us. Law . 118 1, 11 97 (199 8).
181
Id. at 1198.
175
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bodies of commercial and consumer law is to facilitate and sanction private
ordering and private autonomy.182
C. Purposive Interpretation
Llewellyn and his collaborators wanted to require and facilitate the
“purposive interpretation” of the U.C.C.’s provisions.183 In other words,
they did not want judges necessarily to apply the U.C.C.’s provisions as
they were literally written.184 Instead, they wanted judges to understand the
goals of the law, and to interpret and apply its provisions to carry out the
law’s purposes.185
*565 Judges practiced “purposive interpretation” before promulgation
of the U.C.C. Chief Justice John Marshall, for example, arguably used
purposive interpretation in construing the Constitution.186 Llewellyn,
however, wanted to make the U.C.C. the first major codification that
strived to help judges in this task. Prior uniform acts--like most laws-merely stated rules and standards.187 They did not attempt to tell judges
explicitly what purposes the law sought to serve.188 They also did not insist
that judges engage in purposive interpretation. Llewellyn desired a new
kind of legislation.189 He said: “If a statute is to make sense, it must be read

182

Richard E. Speidel et al ., Sales and Secured Transactions: Teaching
Materials 2 (5th ed . 199 3).
183
For a helpful d iscussion of pu rposive interp retation, see Peter A. Alces &
David Frisch, Commercial Codification as Negotiation, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 17,
20-28 (1998); Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 795,
797-98 (19 78).
184
See M cDonne ll, supra note 183, at 797 -98.
185
See id.
186
See David Schultz & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Legal Functionalism and Social
Change: A Reassessment of Rosenberg’s The H ollow Hope: Can C ourts Bring
About Social Change?, 12 J.L. & P ol. 63, 63 & n.3 (199 5) (citing McC ulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819 ), which interpreted the Necessary and
Pro per C lause, as an exa mple ).
187
See Twining, supra note 1, at 323.
188
See id .
189
See L lewellyn, supra note 7, at 189 -90.
The statute in the new style is no minor change, no mere detailed corrective.
It vaults areas on scale heretofore undreamed of; it does not codify and
mildly reform on the basis of past lega l experience; it brings forth at one
stroke a policy, a measure, a who le new field of operation, an a ppropriate
administrative machine, and blanket provisions for what... is in effect
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in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule,
with no purpose or objective, is nonsense.”190
The U.C.C. specifically calls for purposive interpretation in its first
substantive provision. Section 1-102(1) says: “This Act shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.” 191
Carrying this injunction further, the official comment to section 1-102
instructs:
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes
and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of the
purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as
a whole, *566 and the application of the language should be construed
narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes
and policies involved.192
Llewellyn and the other drafters of the U.C.C. did more in section 1-102
than instruct judges to engage in purposive interpretation. The drafters also
sought to help judges discern the purposes of the U.C.C.’s rules so that they
would find the task easier. This assistance took two principal forms. First,
the drafters prepared “official comments” for every section of the U.C.C. 193
The functions served by these comments included explaining the goals of
the statutory commands. Llewellyn wanted the comments to reveal “where
the particular sections are trying to go.”194 Second, in various places, the
drafters incorporated statements of purpose directly into the statute. For
example, the original version of Article 4 not only allowed banks to set the

continuing larg e-scale delegated su blegislation.
Id.

190

Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 400
(1950).
191
U.C.C . §1-102 (1) (1999). T he section then spe cifies: “Underlying purposes
and policies of this Act are (a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform
the law among the various jurisdictions.” Id. § 1-102(2).
192
Id. §1 -102 cmt.
193
See generally Robert H. Skilton, Some Co mments on the Comm ents to the
Uniform Com mercial Code, 1966 W is. L. Rev. 597 (19 66).
194
Llewellyn, supra note 3 9, at 78 2.
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close of their business day at 2:00 p.m., but also explained the reason for
this rule. Section 4-107 said:
For the purpose of allowing time to process items, prove balances and
make the necessary entries on its books to determine its position for the
day, a bank may fix an afternoon hour of two P.M. or later as a cut-off hour
for the handling of money and items and the making of entries on its
books.195
The goal of promoting “purposive interpretation” stemmed directly from
Llewellyn’s conception of Legal Realism. Llewellyn believed that good
judges would strive to do justice and promote sound legal policies. 196 For
this reason he considered it more important to inform judges of the purpose
of the law than to attempt to specify in a strict manner what the law
permitted and what it did not. Indeed, Llewellyn rejected the notion that
legislation should be phrased as though it were “written for dumbbell
judges whom you are trying to corral.”197
*567 In addition, Llewellyn was skeptical about the possibility of
eliminating ambiguity from statutes. He believed that telling judges the
purposes of statutes generally would do the most to help them resolve open
questions in a consistent manner:
Borderline, doubtful, or uncontemplated cases are inevitable. Reasonably uniform interpretation by judges of different schooling, learning and
skill is tremendously furthered if the reason which guides application of the
same language is the same reason in all cases. A patent reason, moreover,
tremendously decreases the leeway open to the skillful advocate for
persuasive distortion or misapplication of the language; it requires that any
contention, to be successfully persuasive, must make some kind of sense in
terms of the reason; it provides a real stimulus toward, though not an
assurance of, corrective growth rather than straitjacketing of the Code by
way of caselaw. 198
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U.C.C. §4-107, 2B U.L.A. 121 (1901) (pre-re vision) (emp hasis added). See
Twining, supra note 1, at 323 (citing U.C.C. section 4-107 as the most prominent
example of this type of provision).
196
See L lewellyn, supra note 39, at 78 2.
197
Id.
198
Karl N. Llewellyn, Collection of Karl Llewellyn Papers in the Law School
of the University of Chicago, J, VI, I, e at 5 (1944) (unpub lished manuscript using
method of citation in Raym ond M. Ellinwo od J r. & W illiam W . Twining, The Karl
Llewe llyn Pap ers: A Guide to the Collection (rev. ed. 1970)), quoted in Twining,
supra note 1 , at 322 .
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Judges have cited section 1-102(1) in hundreds of cases.199 In many
instances, they have recognized arguments against the purposive method of
construing statutes, but nevertheless have followed the section’s directive.
For example, in In re Halmar Distributors, Inc.,200 the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit had to interpret sections 9-103(1)(d)(i) and
(ii). A question arose as to whether the court should read the provisions
literally, or attempt to follow their purpose. The court recognized the
existence of jurisprudential disagreement on this issue, citing commentary
by Professor James J. White and Robert S. Summers in their Uniform
Commercial Code treatise.201 In the end, however, the court decided to
follow section 1-102(1), and to construe the provisions liberally in light of
their purposes.202
*568 Karl Llewellyn, however, did not succeed entirely in fostering
purposive interpretation. Relatively few sections in the U.C.C. contain the
kind of explicit statement of purpose found in pre-revision section 4-107.
203
In addition, many of the official comments did not provide the helpful
guidance that they might have. 204 The notorious comments following
section 2-207 on the battle of forms provide a good example. 205 These
comments have confounded observers who have attempted to discern what
the drafters wanted. 206
The effort to state purposes ran into some difficulty because the drafters
of the U.C.C. did not favor all of the provisions that they included. Section
2-201, the statute of frauds for sales of goods, provides one example. 207 As
noted above, Llewellyn and other drafters of the U.C.C. generally did not
like formalities. Nevertheless, they apparently felt pressure to retain the
199

Performed search in WESTLAW ’s UCC-CS database using “1-102(1)” as
search criteria.
200
968 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 199 2).
201
See id. at 125; see also id., citing 2 White & Summers, supra note 1, §26-20,
at 554-55 (describing Professor W hite’s argument that literal interpretation
promotes certainty).
202
See id .
203
See Twining, supra note 1, at 323.
204
See 1 W hite & Summers, supra note 1, §4, at 13 (noting that the com ments
are not exhaustive, that they sometimes fail to take account of last-minute changes
in the law, and that they may attempt expand or restrict what the actual provisions
say).
205
See U.C.C. §2-20 7 cmts. 1-4 (1999).
206
See Letter from Professor Grant Gilmore to Professor Robert S. Summers
(Sep t. 10, 1980 ), reprinted in S peidel et al., supra note 177, at 51 3-15 .
207
See U.C.C. § 2-20 1 (1991 ).
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statute of frauds.208 The official comments to section 2-201, therefore, do
not seek to explain the goal or purpose of the general requirement of a
writing. 209 Instead, they merely explain the elements.210 In contrast, the
comments to section 2-201 clearly state the reasons for exceptions to the
general requirement of a writing. For example, in discussing an exception
that applies when goods have been accepted or paid for, the official
comments say: “Receipt and acceptance either of the goods or of the price
constitutes an unambiguous overt admission by both parties that a contract
actually exists.”211
Throughout the changes to the U.C.C., purposive interpretation has
persisted to some extent. The 1997 draft of the proposed revision of Article
1 retains a general provision, like the current section 1-102(1), which
directs courts to engage in purposive*569 interpretation.212 In addition,
when the drafters have created the new versions of other articles, they often
have spelled out the reasons for the changes. The revised Article 4 provides
an excellent example. The drafters included expansive comments identifying the purpose of altering the legal rules.213 The comments allow courts
to know which rules make substantive changes,214 and which merely make
technical drafting corrections.215
In addition, some new official comments in other articles overtly explain
the purposes of the law. An official comment to the revised section 3-104,
for instance, states the reasons for defining what constitutes a negotiable
instrument and what does not as follows:

208

See U nif. Sales A ct §4, 1 U.L.A. 71 (1922) (superseded by U.C.C. § 2-201,

196 2).
209

See U.C.C. §2-20 1 cmts. 1-7 (1999).
See id .
211
Id. §2-201 cmt. 2.
212
SeeN ational Conference of Comm issioners on U niform State Laws, D raft
Revision of Uniform Commercial Code §1-102(a) (1997), available at Draft; For
Discussion Only; Revision of Uniform Commercial Code (visited March 30, 2000)
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc1/ucc1.htm> (requiring purposive interpretation).
213
See, e.g., American Law Institute & N ational Conference of Commissioners
on Unifo rm State Laws, Uniform Commerc ial Code, 1972 Official T ext with
Comm ents and Appendix Showing 19 72 Changes app . IX (1972).
214
See, e.g., id. §4-108 , Reason for 1990 C hange.
215
See, e.g., id. §4-406, Reason for 1990 Change (discussing numerous
substantive changes).
210
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Total exclusion from Article 3 of other promises or orders that are not
payable to bearer serves a useful purpose. It provides a simple device to
clearly exclude a writing that does not fit the pattern of typical negotiable
instruments and which is not intended to be a negotiable instrument.216
Enthusiasm for purposive interpretation, nonetheless, appears to have
declined significantly during the recent revisions. Although the evidence
for this proposition is largely impressionistic, it manifests itself in several
ways. First, in revising the U.C.C., the drafters greatly tightened the
phrasing of all of the rules. The revised Articles 3 and 4, for instance,
contain more detailed rules than their predecessors, and these rules strive
to eliminate previous ambiguities. The same is true for the new Article 9,
which is much longer than its predecessor. A fair inference is that the
drafters slowly came to realize that it *570 is better to eliminate uncertainties in statutes than to expect judges to deal with them through purposive
interpretation.
Second, in creating new articles and in revising old articles, the drafters
largely abandoned the practice of stating the purpose of rules in the statute
itself. The new Articles 2A and 4A, and the revised versions of Articles 3,
4, 5, 6, and 8 contain few provisions that expressly state their purposes.
Instead, like most other statutes, they mostly just contain rules.
Third, although the drafters greatly expanded the official comments
when revising the U.C.C., these new comments rarely say anything about
the goals of the law. Instead, they are much more likely to provide
illustrations showing how the language of the rules applies.217 The
comments do not strive to show where the law is “trying to go,” as
Llewellyn said of the original comments, but instead attempt to ensure that
judges know what the rules are.
Fourth, some of the newest official comments appear to take a hostile
view of liberal construction and purposive interpretation. The best example
appears in the new Article 4A on funds transfers. The official comment to
section 4A-102 indicates that courts should not stray from the carefully
formulated rules in the article, stating:

216

U.C.C. §3-102 cmt. 2 (1999); see also id. §3-414 cmt. 5 (explaining the
purp ose o f preve nting a d rawer from issuing a check without recourse).
217
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-305 cmts. 1-5 (1999) (explaining in depth which
defenses are ap plicab le to holders in d ue co urse and non-hold ers in due course,
without explaining the justification for the holder in due course doctrine).
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In the drafting of these rules, a critical consideration was that the
various parties to funds transfers need to be able to predict risk with
certainty, to insure against risk, to adjust operational and security procedures, and to price funds transfer services appropriately. This consideration is particularly important given the very large amounts of money that
are involved in funds transfers.218
Fifth, the courts in recent times noticeably have moved away from
purposive interpretation. Between 1980 and 1995, courts cited section
1-102(1)--the provision requiring purposive interpretation--more than 135
times. 219 Since 1995, however, a *571 mere fourteen cases have cited
section 1-102(1).220 The recent widespread revisions to the U.C.C.
presumably caused or contributed to this decrease.
In lieu of purposive interpretation, courts are taking an increasingly
textualist approach in commercial cases. For instance, in Corfan Banco
Asuncion Paraguay v. Ocean Bank,221 a bank sent a fund transfer that
stated the beneficiary’s name correctly, but contained a nonexistent account
number. Section 4A-207 contains a dispositive rule when the name and
account number refer to different persons, but not when the account
number refers to a nonexistent account.222 Commentators have recognized
this problem as a drafting oversight, and have urged courts to apply the
provision anyway because it would serve the same purpose.223 The court
in Corfan, however, refused to apply the provision because it literally did
not cover the situation at issue.224 Ignoring section 1-102(1) and citing
cases from other subject matters, the court said that judges foremost must
strive to apply the plain meaning of statutes. The court concluded: “In the
present case, although the payment order correctly identified the beneficiary, it referred to a nonexistent account number. Under the clear and
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Id. §4 A-10 2 cm t.
Search performed in WESTLAW’s UCC-CS database using “DATE
(>12/31/1979) & DAT E(<1/1/1995) & 1-102(1)” as search criteria.
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715 So . 2d 967 (Fla. App. 19 98).
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See U .C.C. §4A -207 (2) (1 999 ).
223
See W illiam D. H awkland & Richard Moreno, Uniform Commercial Code
Series § 4A -207 :1 (19 99) (suggesting that the limitation was not intended by the
drafters).
224
See C orfan, 715 So.2 d at 970.
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unambiguous terms of the statute, acceptance of the order could not have
occurred.”225
Although Llewellyn and the other Legal Realists with whom he worked
had some good arguments for wanting purposive interpretation, the
approach has various difficulties. One problem is that telling judges the
purpose of provisions is lengthy and cumbersome.226 The drafters of the
numerous revisions to the U.C.C. may have concluded that it is better just
to state the rules as simply as possible.
Another problem is that giving reasons for rules often creates controversy. People may disagree about the ends to be accomplished. For
instance, commentators have debated whether *572 the statute of frauds,
or the battle of the forms rule, or even the negotiablity of instruments
should continue to exist.227 The drafters of the U.C.C., accordingly, have
had difficulty agreeing on “the purpose” of these rules.
Finally, statements of policy can be just as ambiguous at the rules
themselves.228 For example, section 1-106 instructs courts to administer
remedies liberally “to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as
good a position as if the other party had fully performed.”229 Yet, without
specific rules, courts would have difficulty deciding exactly what this
position would be.230
D. Non-Exclusivity
Llewellyn clearly had great ambition.231 He also must have had supreme
self-confidence to believe that he could lead an effort to codify and make
uniform a substantial portion of the commercial rules in the United States.
No one previously had undertaken a law reform effort even approaching the
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Id.
See T wining, supra note 1, at 323 .
227
See id. at 324.
228
See id .
229
U.C.C. §1-106 (1999).
230
See id. §§2-706, 2-708, 2-709 (seller’s damages); id. §§2-712 to 2-715
(buyer’s dam ages).
231
See Twining, supra note 1 , at 423 n.130 (1973 ) (“Llewellyn’s private
ambition, as he once confessed in a lecture, was to perform the role of a D ewey in
jurisprudence, trying to do for law what the great man had done for other subjects.”); Connolly et al ., supra note 36, at 59 -60 (discussing Llewellyn’s professional ambitions).
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scale of the U.C.C. project.232 Yet, Llewellyn also had a conservative side.
Although he favored the creation of the U.C.C., Llewellyn did not want it
to serve as the sole source of law on the subjects that it covered. Instead, he
wanted the U.C.C. to settle into, and to be supplemented by, a common law
background.
Section 1-103 concisely captures and expresses Llewellyn’s goal of
making the U.C.C. a nonexclusive body of law. It states:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation,
duress, coercion, *573 mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or
invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.233
This section establishes that the U.C.C. does not attempt to regulate all
of commercial law, but merely strives to state some rules. Background law
fills in all of the gaps.
Various commentators have identified the nonexclusivity principle in
section 1-103 as one of U.C.C.’s most significant features. Professors
White and Summers have characterized the section as “probably the most
important single provision in the Code.”234 Grant Gilmore, who served as
the reporter for Article 9, believed that this section distinguished the U.C.C.
from civil-law codes, explaining:
We shall do better to think of [the U.C.C.] as a big statute--or a
collection of statutes bound together in the same book--which goes as far
as it goes and no further. It assumes the continuing existence of a large
body of pre-Code and non-Code law on which it rests for support, which it
displaces to least possible extent, and without which it could not survive.235
The drafters of the U.C.C. had several reasons for wanting to make the
U.C.C. nonexclusive. First, Llewellyn and the other drafters perceived a
tension between having general legal rules and considering the equities of
particular cases.236 They believed that section 1-103 provided a solution by
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See T wining, supra note 1, at 270 (describing the ambitious nature of the
U.C .C. projec t).
233
U.C.C. §1-103 (1999).
234
1 W hite & Summers, supra note 1 , §2, at 6.
235
Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does for the Past, 26 La. L. Rev. 285,
285-86 (19 66).
236
See Rob ert S. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103
of the U niform Commercial C ode , 72 N .W . Univ. L. Rev. 906, 90 6-08 (1978).
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requiring judges to use all available law to reach just and equitable results
unless the U.C.C. specifically displaced the pre-existing background law.237
Second, the drafters saw theoretical difficulties with attempting to make
the U.C.C. an exclusive body of law. They did not believe that any statute
could codify completely all of the necessary legal rules and principles.238
The official comment*574 to section 1-103 explains that the listing of
various supplemental principles “is merely illustrative; no listing could be
exhaustive.”239
Third, Llewellyn did not want to “corral” judges.240 As a Legal Realist,
Llewellyn admired the ways in which judges had used (and sometimes
manipulated) common law and equitable principles to achieve justice in
particular cases.241 Although he wanted to reform the commercial law, he
did not want to deprive judges of their ability to apply “validating” and
“invalidating” causes.242
Llewellyn and his collaborators succeeded in making the U.C.C. a
nonexclusive body of law. Article 2, for example, addresses contracts for
the sale of goods.243 The article nevertheless says very little about many
basic contract doctrines. It does not define or require consideration.244 It
does not address mistake or frustration of purpose.245 It says nothing about
conditions or the consequences of their nonoccurrence. 246 Article 2 does
not attempt to eliminate these doctrines; instead, it merely leaves their
governance to the common law, to the principles of equity, and to other
statutes.247
Article 3, which addresses negotiable instruments, similarly contains
many gaps that the common law must fill. For example, although Article
237

See id. at 909.
See 1 Hawk land, supra no te 34, at §1-103:1 (“[R]elevant ou tside law must
be used from tim e to time, because no law or set of laws can exist in isolation.
Section 1-103 illustrates some of the supplementary general principles making up
this ‘outside’ law.”).
239
U.C.C. §1-103 cmt. 3 (1999).
240
See L lewellyn, supra note 39, at 782 (arguing against statutes that excessively
limit judic ial discre tion).
241
See Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 134-36.
242
See U .C.C. §1-1 03 (199 9).
243
See id. §§2-102, 2-106.
244
See id . §1-1 03 (leaving this issue to su pplemental general principles).
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See id.
246
See id .
247
See id.
238
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3 indicates when holders of instruments take them subject to defenses, it
mostly leaves the definition of the defenses to background law;248 it does
not state the rules regarding infancy, lack of consideration, mistake, and so
forth.249 The original Article 3 similarly said nothing about periods of
limitation, and little about joint and several liability on instruments.
Article 9, which covers security interests, provides more examples of
nonexclusivity. For instance, it gives rights to a *575 secured party to
foreclose upon a default.250 The article, however, never specifies what
constitutes a default.251 Instead, as with the other articles, it leaves this
question--and others like it--to background law. 252
The drafters of the recent revisions to the U.C.C. have not explicitly
retreated from the principle of nonexclusivity. The 1997 draft of the
proposed new Article 1 has altered the language of the original section
1-103 only slightly.253 The official comments to the new version of Article
5 state: “Like all of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
Article 5 is supplemented by Section 1-103 and, through it, by many rules
of statutory and common law.”254 The new Article 8, expressly disavows
attempting to state a “comprehensive code of the law” governing the
purchase of securities or broker-dealer relations.255 Along these same lines,
the June 1999 draft of the proposed revision of Article 2 has not attempted

248

See id . §3-3 05(a) (categorizing defenses that othe r law might supply).
See id. cmt. 1.
250
See id . §9-5 01(1) (stating consequences of a default).
251
See id.
252
In some areas, the drafters of the original version of the U.C.C. sought to fill
in gaps. For instance, sections 2-703 and 2-711 list the remedies available to the
buyer and seller of goods. See id. §2 -703 (a)-(f) (allo wing the seller to withhold or
suspend delivery, identify goods, recover damages by various measures, or cancel);
id. §2 -711 (1)-(2 ) (allowing the b uyer to cover, collect damages, and resell). They
appear to present, along with other provisions in the U .C.C., exclusive rules.
Likewise, Article 3 states various warranties that a person makes when transferring
or presenting a negotiable instrument. See id. §3-416(a)(1)-(5). The article does not
contemp late additional implied warranties asso ciated with negotiable instruments.
Still, these few exclusive aspects of various articles did not undermine the general
principle of nonexclusivity in the original U.C.C.
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SeeU.C.C . §1-10 2(b), Draft, Revision of the Uniform Comm ercial Code,
Annual Meeting 1997 (visited Oct. 30, 1999) <http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ucc1/ucc1.htm> (allowing supplementation by principles of law and equity).
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U.C .C.§5 -103 cmt. 2 (1999).
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Id. art. 8 pref. note, pt. 3(b).
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to capture all of contract law.256 Like the original version, it does not
attempt to define or require consideration, discuss capacity to contract, or
address any number of other basic contract law doctrines.257
Although the U.C.C. continues to rely on supplemental general
principles, the drafters of the various revisions have come closer to making
the U.C.C. the exclusive source of law on various commercial transactions.
The best example of this *576 trend appears in Article 4A, which governs
funds transfers.258 The text of the article appears to state all of the rights
and duties of the parties, leaving very little room for supplementation. The
official comments, moreover, contain a strong exhortation to courts to
exercise caution in supplementing the article. It says:
Funds transfers involve competing interests--those of the banks that
provide funds transfer services and the commercial and financial organizations that use the services, as well as the public interest. These competing
interests were represented in the drafting process and they were thoroughly
considered. The rules that emerged represent a careful and delicate
balancing of those interests and are intended to be the exclusive means of
determining the rights, duties and liabilities of the affected parties in any
situation covered by particular provisions of the Article. Consequently,
resort to principles of law or equity outside of Article 4A is not appropriate
to create rights, duties and liabilities inconsistent with those stated in this
Article.259
While this comment does not contradict section 1-103, it does show a
shift in attitude. This provision, moreover, has discouraged courts from
relying on supplemental general principles.260
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See U.C.C . §2-10 3(a), Draft, Proposed Revisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, Annual Meeting 1999 (visited Oct. 30, 1999 ) <http:// www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/uc c29 9am .htm>.
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See id. art. 2 (containing no provisions on these topics).
258
See id .art. 4A.
259
Id. §4A-102 cm t. (emphasis added).
260
See Geo rge A. Schneider, Article 4A: Developments at the Crossroad of Law
and Foreign Bank Compliance (Part I), 114 Banking L.J. 319, 327 (1997)
(“[C]ourts have been restrictive in permitting non-Article 4A theories to be
applied”); Hyung J. Ahn, Note, Article 4A of The Uniform Commercial Code:
Dangers of Departing from a Rule of Exclusivity, 85 Va. L. Rev. 183, 183-84
(1999) (arguing that the drafters intended Article 4A to be the “exclusive source of
law” and that “it is essentially impossible to permit exceptions without breaching
the integrity of the rules regime of Article 4A ”).
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The new version of Article 9, which will become effective in 2001,261
contains a similar comment cautioning judges about employing general
equitable principles to determine priority:
Section 1-103 provides that “unless displaced by particular provisions
of this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its
provisions.” There may be circumstances in which a secured party’s action
in acquiring a security*577 interest that has priority under this section
constitutes conduct that is wrongful under other law. Though the possibility
of such resort to other law may provide an appropriate “escape valve” for
cases of egregious conduct, care must be taken to ensure that this does not
impair the certainty and predictability of the priority rules.262
This language probably will discourage courts from invoking supplemental general principles.
In addition, in nearly all of the revisions, the drafters have sought to
make the articles more comprehensive. In Articles 3 and 4, for example,
they have included more definitions.263 They also have added periods of
limitation,264 and explicit provisions on joint and several liability.265
Furthermore, they have included specific rules covering subjects that courts
previously addressed under principles of equity. For example, under the
pre-revision version of Article 4, courts sometimes used estoppel to address
issues arising from the misencoding of checks.266 The new section 4-209(a)
has a rule specifically dealing with this issue.267
A review of citations confirms that courts are relying increasingly less
on supplemental general principles. From 1984 through 1988--the five
years prior to most of the recent revisions of the U.C.C.--255 cases cited
section 1-103.268 In the past five years, from 1994 to 1998, only 151 cases
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See U.C.C § 9-701 (1999) (setting July 1, 2001 , as the uniform effective date
for all states adopting the revision).
262
Id. §9 -328 cmt. 8 (1999 R evision) (emp hasis ad ded ).
263
CompareU.C.C. §§3-103, 4-104 (1990) with U.C.C . §§3-102, 4-104 (19 99).
264
See U .C.C. §3-1 18 and cm t. 1 (19 99).
265
See id. §3-116.
266
See F irst Nat’l Bank v. Fide lity Bank, 724 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (E.D. Pa.
198 9).
267
SeeU.C.C. §4 -209(a) (1999).
268
Results of searc h in W estlaw’s UCC -CS database: “date(>12/31/1983 ) and
date(<1/1/19 89) and 1 -103 ” .
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cited section 1-103. 269 Remarkably, in 1998, a mere nine cases cited the
provision.270 With all the revisions that have taken place, the courts have
seen little need to stray from the U.C.C.’s express provisions.
At least two factors appear to explain the move from the original goal
of nonexclusivity. First, banks and businesses *578 have taken an
increasingly strong interest in the content of the U.C.C., and have more
influence now than in the past.271 They have seen the revision process as
an opportunity to resolve important questions about their rights and duties,
and have decided that they do not want to leave these questions to uncertain
supplemental general principles that courts might employ. 272 For example,
during the drafting of Article 4A, banks presumably worried that courts
might award consequential damages or impose liability for negligence in
funds transfers.273
Second, the whole idea of writing an enormous code but leaving many
of the most important issues to supplemental general principles goes against
the grain of current legal thinking. Many lawyers and judges have failed
to understand that, although the U.C.C. is a long and detailed statute, it
does not strive to govern all aspects of the subjects that it addresses.
Section 1-103, to many attorneys, is simply a mystery. Accordingly, errors
have occurred, which the drafters have decided to resolve with more
explicit or detailed rules. These revisions then reinforce the unintended
view that the U.C.C. strives to be a comprehensive code.
E. Compensatory Remedies
Karl Llewellyn and his collaborators had a specific policy concerning
remedies. In particular, they sought to implement rules that would focus on
making the injured party whole. They desired that judges would look
backward, envisioning what remedy an aggrieved party would need for
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Results of searc h in W estlaw’s UCC-CS database: “date(>12/31/1993) and
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See, e.g., U.C .C. §4 A-10 2 cm t. (199 9) (ex plaining how A rticle 4A attemp ts
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drafting process).
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See id.; see also Ahn, supra note 260, at 185-86 (discussing the risks banks
face).
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restoration after a wrong occurred. They did not concern themselves with
the forward-looking question of how damages might affect behavior in the
future. In current terminology, Llewellyn and the *579 other drafters
worried about ex post rather than ex ante considerations.274
Although Llewellyn understood that remedies could serve purposes
other than making the plaintiff whole, he nevertheless chose that end for the
U.C.C.275 Llewellyn believed that people who engage in commercial
transactions should not have to alter their customary practices to meet the
needs of the law.276 On the contrary, the law should reflect actual
commercial behavior as nearly as possible.277 In this respect, Llewellyn
was not interested in creating incentives. Rather, he wanted to establish
remedies that would correct harms done by people who failed to live up to
business standards.
In addition, much of Llewellyn’s jurisprudential interest concerned the
behavior of judges. Llewellyn thought that judges of good faith would
attempt to do justice in individual cases, one way or another.278 To address
this reality, Llewellyn wanted to give them statutory authority to act on
their remedial impulses. Although judges might attempt to take this
approach in any event, Llewellyn famously quipped that “[c]overt tools are
never reliable tools.”279
Furthermore, as a central tenet of his jurisprudence, Llewellyn believed
that people only had legal rights to the extent that the law provided them
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See generally Frank H. E asterbrook, The Suprem e Co urt, 1983 T erm-Foreword: The Co urt and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 10-12 (198 4);
Jason S. Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An E conomic
Analysis of Form, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 347 (1991); Christopher H. Schroeder,
Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 439, 455
(1990) (discussing the d ifference betwe en ex a nte and ex po st liability rules).
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See M ichael T. Gibson, Reliance Damages in the L aw of Sales under Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 909, 927-28 (19 97); Daniel
W . Matthews, Should the Doctrine of Lost Volume Seller Be Retained? A Resp onse
to Professor Breen, 51 U . Miami L. Rev. 1195, 12 10 (199 7).
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279
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remedies.280 As a result, remedies had to focus on the aggrieved party
because they ultimately defined that party’s rights. This view of remedies
did not leave much room for considering future incentives.
*580 The drafters of the U.C.C. had considerable success in implementing their compensatory policy with respect to remedies. Section 1-106(1)
declares:
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal
damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other
rule of law. 281
Notice in reading section 1-106(1) that it focuses on the “aggrieved
party.” The provision seeks to remedy injuries that already have occurred;
it does not contemplate that remedies might affect behavior in the future.
The end is not to encourage business transactions (perhaps by reducing
potential liability) or to discourage wrongdoing (by increasing liability), but
simply to remedy injuries.
The prohibition in section 1-106(1) on special or penal damages is
consistent with the policy of using remedies to compensate victims. The
drafters excluded these remedies because they do not remedy injuries that
aggrieved parties have suffered. Instead, these damages serve to punish and
thus affect future conduct. Again, Llewellyn was not interested in creating
incentives, but instead on making injured parties whole.282
In contrast, the restriction on consequential damages at first might
appear to conflict with Llewellyn’s remedial goal. After all, making an
injured plaintiff whole requires compensating the plaintiff for all damage
280

See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1244 (1931) (“No t only ‘no remedy, no right,’ but
‘precisely as mu ch right as reme dy’.”).
281
U.C.C. §1-106 (1).
282
Cours or legislators logically could decide to exclude punitive damages from
a field for the purpose of creating incentives. For example, they reasonably might
conclude that business people will be more willing to enter particular commercial
transactions if they do not have to worry about the possibility that a jury later might
impose a large penalty. Little, if any, evidence, however, supports a hypothesis that
Llewe llyn and the other drafters wanted to exclude punitive damage s for the
purpo se of creating such incentives. On the contrary, the factors cited above suggest
that they did not pe rmit these kinds o f damages b ecause they d id no t see them as
com pensatory.

KARL LLEWELLYN ’S FADING IMPRINT

40

suffered, whether direct or consequential. Several factors, however,
suggest that the general prohibition on consequential damages does not
sharply undercut the goal of fully compensating aggrieved parties.
First, many commercial lawsuits involve claims that the defendant failed
to pay money owed. For example, the seller of *581 goods may sue the
buyer for not tendering the purchase price,283 or the holder of a negotiable
instrument may sue the maker for dishonoring it.284 The law traditionally
has embraced the theory that a person should suffer no consequential
damages by reason of failing to receive a payment of money because he or
she can borrow the money until the courts provide a remedy.285 Although
the injured party will have to pay interest for the additional loan, the U.C.C.
generally makes this interest recoverable as a form of incidental
damages.286 The prohibition on consequential damages thus does not
inhibit the policy of full compensation in these cases.
Second, despite the general prohibition on the recovery of consequential
damages, the U.C.C. contains many exceptions. Unlike a seller of goods,
the buyer of goods may recover consequential damages.287 Similarly, a bank
may have to pay consequential damages for wrongfully dishonoring a check
or failing to stop payment.288 For the most part, these exceptions ensure
that full compensation occurs.
Third, to the extent that the prohibition on consequential damages
actually has any force, it does not necessarily reflect a rejection of
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Llewellyn’s overall remedial goals. The drafters of the U.C.C. appear to
have been concerned mostly about the difficulty of proving consequential
damages. 289 They thus saw a practical reason to limit recovery by a
plaintiff, even though *582 their theory of remedies suggested the plaintiff
should receive compensation.
Llewellyn’s remedial policy has persisted to some extent throughout the
numerous changes and proposed changes to the U.C.C. The 1997 draft of
the proposed revision to Article 1 perpetuates section 1-106(1) almost
verbatim. 290 Indeed, in a few ways, the drafters of the new versions of
other articles have strived to set damages so that they will accurately reflect
actual losses. For example, the revised Articles 3 and 4 have several new
provisions that use comparative fault principles to allocate losses between
a customer and a bank.291 In addition, Article 4 now has a rule that a
depository bank which fails to revoke a provisional credit promptly no
longer loses its right to revoke, but instead may revoke after paying the
depositor for any damages caused. 292 The drafters further made explicit
that bank customers may recover consequential damages*583 stemming
from the wrongful dishonor of checks.293
In many instances, however, the drafters of the revisions have backed
away from a strict goal of complete compensation. Instead, they have
considered much more carefully how remedies affect behavior. In this
regard, they have sought to adjust damages to create appropriate incentives
and disincentives. They have realized that reducing potential liability can
encourage desirable business transactions. They also have recognized that
imposing additional damages may discourage undesirable conduct.
In the new section 3-411(b), for instance, the drafters made it possible
to recover consequential damages against a bank that wrongfully dishonors
a cashier’s check, teller’s check, or certified check. 294 Although consequential damages conceivably might make the injured party whole, the drafters
289
See id. §2-715 cmt. 4 (considering the difficulty of proving consequential
damages).
290
The proposed revision of Article 1 would change the number of this section,
but would not make any substantive changes to its text. See id. §1-307(a) (Annual
Mee ting Draft 1997) (visited March 30, 2000) <http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ucc1 /ucc1 .htm>.
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did not justify the rule on these grounds. Instead, they cared about how the
recovery would affect the bank’s behavior. The prefatory note to the
revised Article 3 specifies that consequential damages will provide
“disincentives to wrongful dishonor” 295 by banks.
The drafters of the revised version of Article 4A also considered how
damages might affect behavior. For example, section 4A-305 specifically
rejects the suggestion of an important common law decision, Evra Corp. v.
Swiss Bank Corp.,296 that the originator of a payment order might recover
consequential damages from a bank that failed to execute it or delayed in
executing it.297 The drafters worried that the possibility of consequential
damages would make banks reluctant to take payment orders. An official
comment to section 4A-305 says:
The success of the wholesale wire transfer industry has largely been
based on its ability to effect payment at low cost and great speed. Both of
these essential aspects of the modern wire transfer system would be
adversely affected by a rule that imposed on banks liability for consequential damages. A banking industry amicus brief in Evra stated: “Whether
banks can continue to make EFT [Electronic Funds Transfer] services
available on a widespread basis, by charging reasonable rates, depends on
whether they can do so without incurring unlimited consequential risks.
Certainly, no bank would handle for $3.25 a transaction entailing potential
liability in the millions of dollars.”298
The drafters of the revised Article 5 also rewrote its damage provisions
from an ex ante perspective. As in Article 4A, they barred recovery of
consequential damages because they feared that these damages might make
the price of letters of credit prohibitive. The prefatory note explains: “If
consequential and punitive damages were allowed, the cost of letters of
credit could rise substantially.”299 The drafters also used remedies to
discourage misconduct. Section 5-111 now requires issuers who wrongfully
dishonor or repudiate demands for payment to pay attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.300 The *584 drafters explained that imposing these
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costs as damages “provides strong incentives for issuers to honor” letters
of credit.301
III. Implications
The foregoing discussion attempted to document how Llewellyn’s
influence on the jurisprudence of the U.C.C. is diminishing. Many of the
original goals that he and others worked to accomplish have faded. The
U.C.C. now relies more on formalities. Complete and specific statements
of the law have become more common, with reliance on standards and
purposive interpretation diminishing. The drafters of the new and revised
articles have attempted to make them more exclusive, and remedies
presently serve purposes other than compensation for loss.
What has caused Llewellyn’s imprint to fade? No doubt it would be
dramatic and also intellectually satisfying to identify a single person,
interest group, or idea as the impetus for all of the changes in the U.C.C.’s
jurisprudence. This question, however, does not have a simple answer. As
the foregoing discussion indicates, many separate revisions have occurred.
These revisions have taken place over a period of about dozen years.
Numerous individuals, including consumer and business advocates,
academics, and government representatives, had their hands in most of
them. As result, a wide variety of factors probably brought about the
changes in the U.C.C.’s jurisprudence.
One partial hypothesis is that change has occurred because of the
considerable practical experience with the U.C.C. that has accumulated
over the past fifty years. Many lawyers and judges have found the U.C.C.
difficult to understand.302 Whether correctly or incorrectly, the drafters
may have concluded that purposive interpretation, open-ended standards,
the elimination of formalities, and the use of supplemental general
principles tend to create confusion. They have opted for what they consider
more straightforward ways of expressing the law.
*585 Another hypothesis that explains some of the change is that the
law and economics movement has changed the way many legal scholars
evaluate legal rules. In particular, nearly everyone now thinks more
carefully about how the law can create incentives that will affect behavior.
Perhaps for this reason, as noted above, the drafters of the new articles and
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the various revisions have seen that remedies may serve purposes besides
compensation.
A third hypothesis is that, in the decades between the original drafting
of the U.C.C. and its large-scale revision in the past ten or fifteen years,
trust in judges has diminished among the business community. The
perception of judicial activism in constitutional and statutory interpretation
may have contributed to this feeling. Whatever the cause, subsequent
reformers have not shared Llewellyn’s optimism that judges will strive to
reach correct results. As noted above, banks and industry groups have
played a larger role in drafting the law. 303 Unlike Llewellyn, they have seen
a need to “corral” wayward judges.304
A fourth hypothesis is that Llewellyn’s jurisprudential influence has
faded to some extent because the textualist school of statutory interpretation has become very influential. This school emphasizes that judges
should follow legislative commands as expressed in statutes, and should
limit their consideration of other factors.305 To some, principles of
textualism lead to the correlative view that legislatures should take
responsibility for making the law, and should not delegate the task to
judges.306 Purposive interpretation, open-ended standards, and supplemental general principles do not fit well into this model.
Finally, business practices or our knowledge of them may well have
changed in the past fifty years. Undeniably, the marketplace has become
less localized and more competitive. For example, a bank located in one
city may compete with banks in other cities in issuing letters of credit,
certificates of deposit, cashier’s checks, wire transfers, and other instruments *586 governed by the U.C.C. This competition may lead to calls for
clearer rules because each participant wants to know exactly what is
permitted and what is not.
Determining the exact causes of the changes, or arguing for or against
what has occurred, is simply beyond the scope of this article. Llewellyn
and others involved in the U.C.C.’s creation strongly believed in their
positions. The revisers of the U.C.C., on the other hand, apparently have
seen reasons for adopting different approaches in many instances. This
303
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article makes only the claim that a change in the jurisprudence of the
U.C.C. has occurred.
The development, nevertheless, has implications that warrant attention.
A controversial new idea in a field may, over time, become the prevailing
way of thinking. Yet, after the new idea becomes generally accepted, it
may retain that position only temporarily. Economics provides a good
example. During the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes advocated deficit
spending by the government to stimulate the economy. Although conservatives initially opposed the idea, it later gained near-universal support.
President Richard Nixon, indeed, famously justified his deficit spending by
exclaiming: “We are all Keynesians now.”307 A few decades later,
however, monetarism largely has replaced Keynesian theory in current
economic thinking.
Llewellyn’s fading imprint on the U.C.C. suggests that the same
three-step phenomenon has occurred in the law. In the 1920s and 1930s,
the Legal Realists were expressing new ideas. In the 1950s, their views had
become so widely accepted that Llewellyn could shape the nation’s
commercial law with his jurisprudence. By 1988, echoing Nixon in a much
cited review, Professor Joseph Singer confidently quipped: “We are all
legal realists now.”308 But as this article shows, just ten years later, we are
not all Legal Realists, or at least not in the mold of Karl Llewellyn.
*587 If Llewellyn’s theories had remained dominant, then the drafters
of the U.C.C. would not be adding formalities and replacing standards with
rules. They would not be backing away from purposive interpretation,
nonexclusivity, and the policy of using remedies solely for compensation.
Perhaps this development suggests that attempting to maintain a single
consistent jurisprudence in the U.C.C., or any major codification, for a long
time is impossible. Our legal culture probably is too pluralistic for any one
school of legal thought to dominate an entire field of law for half a century.
Llewellyn’s success in at least setting the U.C.C. on its initial jurisprudential path may have been the best accomplishment possible.
Conclusion
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This article tells a story of accomplishment and loss. Karl Llewellyn
achieved great success in implementing his ideas in the U.C.C. Yet, as
nearly half a century has passed, the U.C.C. has undergone substantial
revision. The changes have altered not just the substance of the law, but
also its underlying jurisprudence. Much of Llewellyn’s influence has
dwindled as the drafters of subsequent revisions have rejected or ignored
Llewellyn’s insights from Legal Realism.
This development might have saddened Llewellyn, but it probably
would not have surprised him. In his last book, Jurisprudence, Llewellyn
observed that two legal styles have competed with each other throughout
the history of the nation.309 In the 1830s and 1840s, judges adopted a rather
flexible manner of interpreting the law. 310 Between 1885 and 1910,
however, a formal style supplanted this mode of judging.311 Starting in the
1920s and 1930s, the less formal approach re-emerged, leading to the
jurisprudence of the U.C.C. two decades later.312 Llewellyn, I am sure,
could foresee that times again would change, and that the formal approach
would regain adherents.
*588 Llewellyn’s fading imprint on the jurisprudence of the U.C.C.
should influence the law’s future interpretation and revision. As explained
above, Article 1 presently contains sections that explicitly instruct courts
to engage in purposive interpretation,313 to rely on supplemental general
principles,314 and to use remedies to compensate aggrieved parties.315 As
the nature of the U.C.C. has changed, these sections have become
inconsistent with the rest of the code.
The latest draft of the proposed revision to Article 1 restates Llew
ellyn’s principles in several sections as though the rest of the U.C.C. has
not undergone any transformation.316 The drafters should rethink this
decision because the sections no longer reflect the current character of the
code. To reaffirm them after so much of the U.C.C. has changed has no
309
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justification. Unless the revisers plan to reinvigorate Llewellyn’s ideas
throughout all of the articles, they should redraft or eliminate Article 1
provisions that misleadingly would state abandoned objectives as general
principles.

